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Abstract
Recent international  experience  has shown that  land access and obtaining building permits, which in
excessively complex administrative  procedures required  several countries take more than two years.  Countries
to establish and operate a business  discourage  inflows of  that impose excessive  administrative  costs on entry tend
foreign  direct investment.  Morisset and Lumenga Neso  to be equally intrusive in firm operations,  thereby
present a new database  on the administrative  costs faced  weakening the argument  that barriers to entry are a
by private investors  in 32 developing countries. The  substitute for the government's  unwillingness or inability
database  is much more comprehensive  than the existing  to regulate enterprise operations.  The level of
sources,  as it contains  not only information on general  administrative  costs is positively correlated with
entry procedures,  such as business  and tax registration,  corruption incidence  and exhibits a negative correlation
but also captures  regulation on land access,  site  with the quality of governance,  degree  of openness,  and
development,  import procedures,  and inspections.  The  public wages. These correlations suggest that
data include measures  on the number of procedures,  administrative  reforms  need to be incorporated  into the
direct monetary costs,  and time.  broader agenda  for reforms such as trade and financial
The cost of administrative  procedures vary  liberalization,  the  fight against  corruption,  and public
significantly  across countries.  The most important  sector administration.
barriers appear to be the  delays associated with securing
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Foreign  direct  investment  (FDI)  flows increased  fivefold  during the  1990s,  reaching  almost
US$250  billion by 2000.  These  flows,  however,  have  been concentrated  in a few countries
with the world's top  30 host countries accounting for 95%  and 90% of total FDI inflows and
stocks  (UNCTAD,  2001).  The  reasons  for  this  concentration  are  multiple.  Countries  with
large  consumer  markets  and  abundant  natural  endowments  attract  more  multinational
enterprises.  The recent literature,  e.g., Morisset (2000) has also demonstrated that the quality
of the investment climate plays an important  role in the  location decision  of many investors.
There has  been  an increasing  recognition that administrative  procedures  -and the  costs  and
delays  associated  with them  - can significantly  influence  the location of multinational  firms
and their resulting productivity (Dollar et al., 2001).
The role of administrative barriers has been investigated  by Hemando de Soto  in his seminal
work on the negative impact of "red tape" on business activities.  Time matters for investors -
both foreign and local.  A country where  it takes excessive  time and costs  to accomplish  all
the  procedures  necessary  to establish  and  operate  a business  will  see  its potential  investors
lose money and decide to locate elsewhere  or cancel their investment projects.  In spite of the
relevance  of this issue, there  have been only a few attempts to quantify barriers  in developing
countries.  The main reason for the lack of quantitative analysis  is that information  is difficult
to  compile  since its  collection requires  first-hand  experience  and extensive  interaction  with
government's officials.
The objective  of this paper is to study the importance  of administrative  barriers in a set of 32
developing  countries.  The  important  contribution  of this  paper  is  that  it  provides  a  new
database  on the number of procedures,  the delays and  costs that investors have  to  face when
they want to establish and  operate a business.  The database  covers  entry procedures  such  as
business and tax registration and procedures  required to access  land, develop a site, connect to
main utility services as well  as a  few operational  procedures  such as import or export.  These
last  procedures  have  not been  included  in previous  studies  (e.g.  Djankov  et  al.,  2002  and
World Competitiveness Report,  2001),  even though  they play  a decisive role in  the location
decision  of many  foreign  investors.  Furthermore,  the  inclusion  of operational  procedures
3allows us to examine the extent  to which governments  are intrusive after a company has been
established.
This paper also  attempts to explain cross-country  variations  in  administrative  costs faced by
investors.  By  focusing  on  the  bureaucratic,  technological,  and  institutional  aspects  of the
procedures,  traditional  policy  recommendations  have  suggested  eliminating  duplicative
documents  or forms, establishing virtual networks or on-line registration as well as implement
so-called  "one-stop  shops".  These recommendations,  albeit  useful, have  generally  failed  to
generate  the  expected  results  in  most  developing  countries,  suggesting  that  the  origin  of
excessive  administrative  barriers  lies in more  fundamental  factors.  The role of governance,
trade  and financial openness, the political  regime, public wages,  and the legal system will  be
explored using simple  correlations  across  countries.  Our results suggest that administrative
procedures  should be viewed  in a broader  context than usually adopted by policymakers  and
advisors.
The  paper  is  organized  as  follows.  Section  I  discusses  the  definition  and  role  of
administrative barriers.  Section  2 provides  information on the database including  sources  of
information and assumptions used in constructing  the series as well as its limitations.  Section
3 describes  the  basic  results  and  compares  them  across  countries  and  regions.  Section  4
studies the reasons why countries have different set of administrative  barriers.  Lastly,  section
5 concludes  by a brief summary and four directions for future research.
II. What Are Administrative Procedures?
Administrative  procedures  exist in all countries.  Indeed,  it is  legitimate for governments  to
control  or  even  screen  for  some  activities  and  investors  who  are  going  to  install  on  their
territory.  Many reasons explain the presence of these procedures.  Authorities  have generally
advanced  arguments  such  as  security,  protection  of the environment,  health protection,  and
quality control.  The economic  literature has justified government's  intervention in the public
interest  theory  of regulation  developed  by  Pigou  (1939).  In  short,  government  regulation
reduces or eliminates market failures,  therefore raising global public utility.'
For fuller details,  see Djankov et al.  (2002).
4Still,  countries  significantly  differ  in  the  ways  in  which  they  regulate  business  entry  and
operations.  Excessive  regulation,  can  lead to substantial  delays  and costs  to firms that  may
decide to locate elsewhere or operate  in the informal sector.  The lost revenues can lead to a
sub-optimal equilibrium and lower public utility.  Along these lines, the public choice  theory
has  argued  that regulations  can  be  captured  by  bureaucrats  and  politicians  or by  existing
industries,  which are able to  keep out their competitors  (Stigler,  1969;  Shleifer and Vishny,
1993).  In both ways,  the overall  social utility is reduced  at the benefit of a few privileged
groups.
It is difficult to identify when regulation is excessive.  The approach followed in this paper is
to  compare  current  practices  in  a  set  of  32  developing  countries  by  identifying  26  core
administrative procedures  that are generally required  to set up and operate a business.  These
key procedures  allow  comparisons  across  countries.  For simplicity,  we  grouped  them  into
three  principal  categories,  which  are  briefly  described  below  (while  each  procedure  is
presented in Table 1).
Entry Approvals.  For  a  foreign  investor,  entry  starts  with  legal,  statistical,  labor,
pension,  and fiscal  registration.  Often,  the  investor  also  applies  for fiscal  incentives.  The
requirements  and  background  documentation  for these  procedures  vary  significantly  across
countries  depending on their  institutional  and legal frameworks.  Some countries have been
able to simplify these  steps by using one application  form,  one identification  number, or one
agency (the so called "one-stop-shop"), 2 while others have retained a more diffuse process.
Access  to  land,  site development,  and utility  connections.  Subsequent  to  entry
registration,  or sometimes  in  parallel  to it, the investor  has to  secure  land access  as well  as
develop his business site and connection to main utilities.  Land ownership  is a sensitive issue,
especially  in Africa (local communities)  and in Eastern and Central Europe.  For this reason,
the investor will often  lease  land  from the government  rather purchase it.  Both alternatives
are  considered  in  our  paper.  The process  of buying  or  leasing  land  can  be  lengthy  and
expensive,  since  it  involves  multiple  state  agencies  and  sometimes  the  approval  of local
communities.  Once  an investor  has secured  land,  his next regulatory  challenge  is to obtain
permits,  generally  from  the  local  authorities,  for  site  and  building  developments.  Those
2 For fuller details,  see L. Wells  (1992).
5generally  require  pre-approvals,  multiple  site  inspections,  (health,  security;  labor,  etc.)  and
final  approvals.  Lastly,  the  investor  has  to  secure  connections  to  key  utilities,  such  as
electricity and telephones.
Table la: Summary of administrative procedures
Categories
A  ENTRY APPROVALS
1  Company registration
2  Investment Code Registration
3  Initial Bank Deposit
4  Residence and Working Pernit
5  Tax Office Registration
6  Foreign Investment Licensing
7  Business and Trading Permit
8  Statistical  Office Registration
9  Existence, Conformity, Opening Reporting
10  Health Care & Pension Plans
11  Social Security Registration
B  LAND, SITE DEVELOPMENT,  UTILITY
12  Access to Land (State Land)
13  Town Planning Certificate
14  Site Inspections and General Approvals
15  Building Permits
16  Electricity and power connection
17  Telephone  and Telex
18  Water and Sewerage
19  Post, Box and Private Bag
C  OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS
20  Import-Export Intention and Permits
21  Import-Export Clearance Process
22  Foreign Exchange Controls
23  Fiscal Situation Certificate  (Quitus)
24  Health and Safety Inspections
25  Labor Inspections
26  Social Welfare Plan Payments
Operational requirements.  The  last  set  of  procedures  consists  of  operational
requirements  that  the  investor  has  to  fulfill  when  operating  his  business.  The  main
requirements  included  in  this  paper consist  of import-export  procedures,  foreign  exchange
controls,  tax  and  social  security payments,  as  well  as  labor and health  inspections.  These
6'operational  requirements,  especially  for import-export,  are  fundamental  for  enterprises  that
interact with foreign markets.
We  believe  that  these  three  categories,  which  include  26  separate  core  administrative
procedures,  provide  a sufficiently  broad basis  for a cross-country  comparison.  We chose  to
avoid sector-specific  procedures  and other  procedures  such as  environment  assessment  that
differ significantly in their concept across  countries.  Nevertheless,  it is worth noting that we
cover  more  procedures  than  previous  studies,  which  have  focused  on  the  general  entry
approvals  (see  for example Djankov et al.,  2002) or building permits  (Bertrand  and Kramaz
(2001)).  By  including  land  access  and  utility  connection,  we  extend  the  analysis  to
procedures  that  are  sources  of important  delays  in  most countries  and,  thus,  are  likely  to
influence  significantly  the investment  decision  of private  enterprises.  Furthermore,  the data
on operational  procedures  allow us to examine  to  what extent governments  are  intrusive  on
both  entry  and  operations.  This  distinction  is  interesting  since  it can  be  argued  that some
governments  choose to impose a higher burden on entry because they are unable or unwilling
to regulate operating enterprises.
II.  Sources and Methodology
Our database covers  32 developing countries,  including 20 African  and 7 Eastem and Central
Europe countries with by alphabetical  order (the year of the data collection  is in parenthesis):
Argentina  (1999),  Armenia  (2000),  Bulgaria  (2000),  Burkina  Faso  (2000),  Chile  (1999),
Czech  Republic  (1999),  Egypt  (1999),  Ghana  (1995),  India  (1999),  Jordan  (1998),  Kenya
(1999), Latvia (1999),  Lesotho (1997), Lithuania (1999),  Madagascar  (1998), Malawi (2000),
Mali  (1998),  Mauritania  (1999),  Morocco  (1999),  Mozambique  (1996),  Nigeria  (2001),
Romania  (2000),  Slovenia  (2000),  Senegal  (1999),  South Africa  (1999),  Swaziland  (1997),
Tanzania  (1997), Tunisia (1999),  Turkey  (2001), Uganda  (1997),  Zambia (1999),  Zimbabwe
(1999).  Focusing  on  developing  countries  ensures  a  degree  of homogeneity  in  terms  of
institutional  and  legal  development  as  well  technological  and  administrative  capacity.  A
comparison  with  industrial  countries,  while  useful,  would  capture  significant  differences
between countries not necessarily related to administrative procedures but rather to their level
of economic  development.3
3  For example,  business  registration  is  only  a  mouse  click  away from  investors  in  most  industrial  countries
thanks  to  the development  of on-line registration.  Such  instrument  is not readily  available  in the  majority  of
7The two main sources  are reports from the Foreign  Investment Advisory Service  (FIAS)  and
the United States Agency for International  Development (USAID).  These two agencies  have
collected the  necessary  information  through official documents  and interviews  with focused
groups  such as private investors,  government agencies,  as well as private accounting and legal
firms.  These interviews  should not be viewed as systematic surveys  since they do not cover a
large  sample of users  and  regulators.  Moreover,  it has  to be recognized  that the quality  of
information varies across reports and countries.  In most reports, the main objective was not to
quantify administrative  procedures  but rather to identify issues and develop recommendations
for  the  relevant  authorities.  Moreover,  some  procedures  have  not  been  systematically
reviewed  in every country,  as the focus of each report depended  on the interest expressed by
the authorities.  Whenever possible,  the data on entry approvals were complemented by those
collected in Djankov et al (2002).
For each country of our sample, the data were collected  at one point  in time, between  1997
and  2001  (with  the  exception  of  Ghana  and  Mozambique).  The  collection  dates  are
sufficiently close to permit a comparison across countries.  We report  the number  of official
steps  for  each of the identified  procedures  as well as  their time  and costs.  The number of
steps  indicates  the number of documents  and  institutions  for each procedure.  For example,
business  registration  may  involve  successively  the  Register  of Commerce,  the Ministry  of
Finance,  and  the  Ministry  of Trade  and  Industry  (without  accounting  for  notary  services).
The time or delay associated to each procedure provides a proxy for the investor's opportunity
costs.  When  possible,  time  is  defined  as  the  real  time  spent by  the investors,  rather than
official  requirements.  We  ignore  the  time  spent to  gather information,  and  assume  that all
investors know all procedures  from the very beginning.  Lastly, the monetary expenses  reveal
the direct official fees to obtain forms, fiscal stamps, and so on.  We do not consider costs that
are paid to support private  services  such as notary fees and legal services  and do not account
for bribes.  These three reporting methods provide complementary information.
We also report  the total  administrative  costs -defined  as the sum of time and out of pocket
monetary fees-faced by private investors  in each country.  When an enterprise invests in one
developing  countries  because  of  limited  human  and  financial  resources  as  well  as  poor  communication
infrastructure.
8country, both the aggregate  time and direct monetary costs spent in the administrative process
matter in the decision.  To calculate total administrative  costs, the main difficulty is to convert
time into monetary  costs.  For simplicity,  we distinguish between  local and foreign  investors
but assume that all investors have the same utility function  and that all projects  have the same
size.  We then convert  time  into monetary  costs  by considering  that for each business  day
spent  in  the  administrative  process,  the  foreign  investor  has  a  daily  opportunity  cost
equivalent to the average  daily income per capita in OECD countries  (which account for over
85%  of FDI  outflows  worldwide).  Alternatively,  the  local  investor's  opportunity  cost  is
equivalent  to the average  income per capita in his country.5 We further assume that the local
investor  follows  simplified  procedures  since  it  does  not  need  to  obtain  immigration  and
residence permits as well  as the "foreign investment"  approval,  which is still in use  in some
sample countries.6
In every country,  the number  of procedures,  time and monetary  costs vary  significantly  not
only across  industries,  but also  with  firms'  characteristics  such as size,  ownership  and legal
status.  For  this reason,  our  approach  has  been  to  consider  a  "standardized"  firm  with  the
following  main  characteristics:  it  performs  general  industrial  or  commercial  activities,  it
operates  in  the  largest  city  by  population  (mainly  countries  capitals),  it  is  exempt  from
industry-specific  requirements,  it does participate  in foreign trade,  it employs expatriates  and
a total of 20-50 employees, it purchases or leases State land7, it is connected to 10 phone lines
and uses on average  100 kWh of electricity during peak hours (and half otherwise),  and it is a
limited  liability  company  with  a  initial  capital  of US$10,000.8 Furthermore,  if a  range  of
delays or costs were  reported, we used the median.  If costs  were reported  in US  dollars,  we
register them directly.  When, however,  they were  in  local  currency,  we  converted  them to
U.S.  dollars  using  that  year's  end  exchange  rate.  By  using  a  standardized  company,  we
4As explained below, we assume that one standardized firm makes all investments.
5 For local  investors, we  have followed the same  approach than Djankov et al.  (2002).  It has to be noted  that the
opportunity costs is likely to be underestimated  because  the revenue  from local  investors is certainly higher than
the average  in each country.
6 In  reality,  additional  differences  are  likely to exist because  local  investors  are more  familiar  with  the  system
and with the government's  officials  that are foreign  foreigners.  In a recent paper, Smarzynska  and Wei (2000)
have shown  that  foreign investment  under the  form of joint ventures  is  more likely to occur with complex  and
long  administrative  procedures.  In  other  words,  they  have  shown that  administrative  barriers  influence  FDI
ownership  composition  as  foreign  investors  look  for  local  partners  in  a complex  and  lengthy  administrative
system.
7  The value of land is equal to 50 % of the initial capital, the renting price of land  10 % of the capital.  We set the
superficies of the land at  1'000 square meters with 60 % of them being used or covered.
8The amount of US$10,000 has been retained for two reasons.  First, it is close to the average minimum required
capital  in most African countries  and,  second,  it is not far from the  figures chosen  by Djankov  et al (2002)  and,
thus, facilitates  the comparison.
9exclude  potential information  about the variability of the procedures,  which also influences
the location decision of investors.
A word of caution might be necessary,  especially when trying to interpret cumulative  figures.
First, the database  does not report the cumulative time that the investor will spend  in dealing
with all procedures.  Some of them can be realized simultaneously,  while others  can only be
initiated  after others  have been  achieved.  A  second limitation  is that the database  does not
report how often  a business  has to  face operational  procedures,  like for example for import-
export  activity.  By contrast,  entry  registration  procedures  have  to  be realized  only once  -
when the company  attempts  to  establish  in the  country.  Lastly,  it is important  to note that
missing data do not necessarily mean that the procedure does not exist in the country.  Rather,
it may indicate that we did not find any information in the sources used for this study.
IV. Cross Country Comparison: Basic Results
The data reveal  considerable  variations  in the number of administrative procedures  as well as
the time and monetary costs  associated to them across countries.  Still, in almost all countries,
the aggregate  costs appear sufficient to explain why investors are influenced  in their decision
and  may decide  to circumvent  administrative procedures  by locating elsewhere  or remaining
in the non-official economy.  The overall results for every country are summarized in Table 2,
while data for each individual procedure are available upon request.  Below is a review of the
basic results  in terms of number of steps, time and monetary costs, followed by a comparison
of the total administrative  costs  faced by local  and foreign  investors,  respectively,  in each
country of our sample.
A  closer  look at  the number  of procedures  emphasizes  that the  second  category  (access  to
land) requires  the largest number of steps,  up to  125  in Turkey (when the  land  is purchased
from the State).9 Among this category, the site inspections  and approvals  by local authorities
are  the  main barriers,  followed  by  building  permits.  Operational  requirements  consist  on
average  of more  procedures  than  entry  registration  (11.3  versus  10.6),  especially  in Africa
where  import-export permits  and processes  as well  as health and safety  inspections  generate
many  administrative  steps  (up  to  15  in  Nigeria  for  only  import-export).  The  number  of
9 Contrary to most countries  included in our sample,  Turkey has an extensive  and active market  for private  land.
In  that  case,  the  delays  associated  to  administrative  procedures  would  have  been  much  shorter  than  those
reported for purchasing  State land.
10procedures  also  varies  significantly  across  countries,  even  for  simple  procedures  such  as
company registration  ranging  from  1 (in  Ghana,  Senegal,  or Uganda)  to  7  or 8 in  Burkina
Faso and Bulgaria.
Table 2: Summary of Main Results per Country
Number of  Time (number of  Monetary Cost
procedures  business  days)  (US  $)
Argentina  13  47  763
Armenia  13  45  10  59  131  15  84  4414  75
Bulgaria  29  40  19  157  545  291  233
Burkina Faso  14  29  655
Chile  9  26  620
Czech  11  65  447
Egypt  10  52  943
Ghana  8  19  12  34  255  30  338  2940  202
India  9  39  261
Jordan  15  36  12  60  89  11281
Kenya  10  22  10  51  70  39  397  3975  2282
Latvia  17  19  114  367  5885
Lesotho  2  19  8  61  341  122  120  154
Lithuania  10  22  9  36  166  139  1550
Madagascar  11  15  171  375  8  80  47
Malawi  10  30  2  46  413  20  470  562  10
Mali  9  27  13  79  170  154  2696  250
Mauritania  11  10  54  328  3186
Morocco  12  16  5  91  278  63  255  1149  1981
Mozambique  8  34  13  106  625  143  11045
Nigeria  8  23  26  18  210  30  176  13750  809
Romania  10  42  50  584  154  22523
Senegal  11  25  10  96  228  40  801  1847  51
Slovenia  12  30  7  30  45  2895
South Africa  6  23  158
Swaziland  10  13  8  53  117  20  391  4006  200
Tanzania  19  25  18  187  795  45  3040  508  12
Tunisia  7  39  286
Turkey  22  125  8  121  985  304
Uganda  9  24  14  69  495  70  607  1520
Zambia  6  29  124
Zimbabwe  6  21  10  85  90  30  352  4379  13
Average  11  31  11  68  334  41  504  4723  756
Minimum  2  13  2  18  45  8  80  47  10
Maximum  29  125  26  187  985  122  3040  22523  3186
Note:  Missing data means  that the information  was neither available nor applicable  in the country.
11The investors spend considerable time in administrative procedures  with enormous  variations
across  countries  (Table  1).  Data on  individual  countries  indicate  that  the  longest  delay  is
found in Turkey  (1106 business days),  followed by Mozambique  (731), Bulgaria  (702 days),
and Romania  (634 days).  The most important delays arise from land (purchase  from the state)
and site  development  procedures,  especially  permits  and  inspections  from  local  authorities
that appear  relatively  little  efficient  in processing  the  investors'  requests.  It is noteworthy
that,  in  spite  of  recent  trade  liberalization  efforts,  import-export  permits  and  clearance
processes  are  still  extremely  time-consuming  in Africa,  averaging  almost  47  business  days
(with  a maximum  delay of 63  days  in Morocco)  and exceed  significantly  the  time spent in
other regions.  In most countries,  general  entry approvals  appears  less  time consuming than
other  procedures,  with  the  notable  exception  of residence  and  working  permits  that  can
generate delays above 2 months in Bulgaria or Tanzania.
The direct official monetary costs exceed US$10,000 in 3 countries of our sample (Romania,
Nigeria,  and Mozambique),  but remain relatively low in absolute values in the majority of the
countries.  They are however relatively  high when they are compared  to the average  income
per capita  in  most countries,  especially  in Africa  where  most investments  are  from micro-
enterprises.  By far, the procedures  associated  to land access are  the most expensive  in most
countries, averaging over US$1,500, followed by building permits (especially  in Africa), and
some utility connection  (electricity in Romania).  Among the operational  procedures,  import-
export processes  can require payments  over US$1,000  in Morocco,  Nigeria,  and Mauritania.
Finally, general entry approvals  can require  paymnent over US$1,000  in Senegal and Slovenia
but  are  almost  free  in  Malawi,  Madagascar,  and  Argentina.  Among  these  procedures,
immigration and working permits are generally the most expensive.
The  aggregate  time  and  fees  spent  by local  and foreign  investors  are presented  in Table  3,
where countries are ranked in ascending  order.  It has to be noted that we used the two series
normalized  by the number of procedures  to minimize the bias introduced by difference in the
information  reported  in  each  country.  The  ranking  per  country  indicates  that  Zambia,
Madagascar,  and  India  are  relatively  inexpensive  for  their  local  investors,  in  contrast  to
Romania,  Jordan,  Slovenia,  and Nigeria.  The total administrative  costs for foreign  investors
are  relatively  low  in  South  Africa,  Zambia,  and  Chile,  but  can  exceed  US$5,000  per
procedure  in  Turkey,  Mozambique  and  Romania.  The  variations  in  the  aggregate  costs
12between  worst and best performers  seem sufficient to explain FDI patterns  across countries.
These  variations  can  also  be  interpreted  as  the  maximum  bribes  for  circumventing  or
accelerating  the administrative  approval  process in every country.  Although the investor can
establish  elsewhere or operate in the non-official economy,  it would be equivalent  for him to
pay,  ceteris paribus, these  extra  amounts  (per procedure)  for  release  from  regulation.  The
positive  correlation  between  administrative  costs  and  bribes  has  been  advanced  by  the
"tollbooth" theory and will be explored further in the next section.
Table 3: Total costs  per procedure (in US$) a/
FOR LOCAL INVESTORS  FOR FOREIGN INVESTORS
Madagascar  48  Zambia  417
India  83  Chile  470
Lesotho  85  Burkina Faso  517
Malawi  100  Tunisia  576
South Africa  101  Argentina  639
Tunisia  105  Egypt  727
Burkina Faso  135  Czech  869
Chile  168  India  974
Uganda  196  Mauritania  1221
Senegal  201  Latvia  1229
Egypt  214  Kenya  1318
Czech  243  Armenia  1366
Tanzania  246  Swaziland  1560
Mali  255  Senegal  1784
Ghana  257  Lithuania  1850
Argentina  319  Ghana  1884
Armenia  326  Zimbabwe  2098
Morocco  395  Mali  2172
Zimbabwe  402  Slovenia  2363
Bulgaria  405  Lesotho  2605
Swaziland  443  Morocco  2650
Kenya  444  Malawi  2703
Lithuania  449  Uganda  2733
Mauritania  512  Jordan  2941
Latvia  540  Nigeria  3343
Turkey  832  Madagascar  3452
Mozambique  1070  Tanzania  4756
Nigeria  1365  Bulgaria  6023
Slovenia  1535  Romania  6207
Jordan  1945  Turkey  6480
Romania  2530  Mozambique  6695
Note:  a' Total costs are defined  as delays  (converted  into monetary  costs) plus  direct costs associated
to  administrative  procedures  in  each  country.  Delays  have  been  converted  into  monetary  costs
assuming that  opportunity costs  for local  investors are  equal to the number of days multiplied  by the
daily  GDP  per capita  in  the  country.  b/ For foreign  investors,  we  used  the  daily average  GDP per
capital in OECD countries.
13The ranking per country differs  significantly for local and foreign investors.  The explanation
is  that time  is  relatively  more valuable  for foreign  investors,  who  have higher  opportunity
costs.  Time  or delays  account  for about  80 percent of their total  costs,  while  they are  only
equivalent  to  30  percent  of total  costs  for local  investors.  This  difference  may reflect  that
foreigners  are less likely to accept long delays  as they are used to best practices in industrial
countries.
We conclude  this section by exploring a few patterns  from the data.  First,  it appears that the
countries with the highest number of procedures  are not necessarily the ones with the longest
delays  or  greatest  monetary  costs.10 For  example,  Latvia has  many more  procedures  than
Nigeria  but a greater  capacity to deal efficiently with them."  It is therefore possible  that the
number of steps  reflects  the public  interest  theory  through which the  government  protect  its
citizen,  while  delays  and  costs  can  be  viewed  as  a  rough  indicator  of the  government's
capacity or willingness to respond to investors'  requests (the public choice theory).
Another insight  from the data is that governments  are likely to impose high barriers on entry
and operations  simultaneously, weakening the argument that entry procedures are a substitute
for the  government's  inability  or unwillingness  to  interfere  with operating  enterprises.  Our
data  show  relatively  high  positive  correlation  coefficients  between  entry  and  operational
procedures,  in terms of number of steps (0.21), time (0.58)  and direct costs (0.60).
V. Administrative barriers: Why?
There  are  many  possible  explanations  to  why  the  costs  of administrative  barriers  vary  so
much across  countries.  If most advisers have focused on the bureaucratic,  technological  and
institutional  aspects of administrative  procedures,  this focus  has failed to generate significant
progress in most countries.  We believe that the reasons for this lack of success  are rooted in
the fundamental features of each country.  Therefore,  we propose to explore to what extent the
10  For example, Nigeria does  have a reasonable number of procedures compared  to other African countries,  and
delays are relatively short, but costs exceed  3 to 4 times those identified  in Senegal, Mali,  and Ghana.
" The relatively low  positive correlation coefficients  between the number  of steps and the  associated time (equal
to 0.49) and between  the number of steps and monetary costs (0.16)  suggest that that these variables may capture
different  motivations  from  governments.  Note that Djankov  et al,  found higher correlation  coefficients  in their
study,  with a  different  sample of countries  and  by normalizing  costs  and  delays  with the average  income  per
capita in each country.
14variations  in  administrative  costs  are  explained  by  structural  factors  such  as  the  political
regime,  the  corruption  level,  the degree  of openness,  the public  sector  wage  policy,  and the
legal system  in use in each country of our sample.  Including these factors should allow us to
better understand the success and failures of governments in their efforts to streamlining these
administrative  barriers.
In the absence of a precise analytical model underlying the factors  determining administrative
costs, the basic variables  for our analysis were selected  on the basis of the existing  literature.
At the  outset,  it is useful  to note  that  we  voluntarily  focus  on  the  public  choice  theory  of
regulation  by retaining  the  aggregated  administrative  costs  faced  by  investors,  rather  the
number  of procedures,  as  the  variable  that  we  want  to  explain  across  countries.'2 We
alternatively use the aggregate  costs faced by local and foreign investors as reported in Table
3. Controlling for the level of development  is crucial and so we divided the costs by GDP per
capita in each country.  Not only is it expected that costs are strongly and positively correlated
to economic development but also that, without income controls,  our political and institutional
variables  may be  no more  than proxies  for income  levels.'3 In making this  adjustment,  we
also follow Djankov et al. (2002).
The selection of the basic variables, which has been partly driven by the availability of data in
our  sample  of countries,  is  provided  below.  The  level  of corruption or the  lack  of good
governance is expected  to influence the administrative costs as bureaucrats  and politicians are
more likely to capture the extra rents.  Corruption can be both the cause and the consequence
of high  administrative  barriers.  While  we  recognize  this double  causality,  we privilege  the
explanation  that  it  is  easier for government  to  reduce  or  remove  administrative  procedures
than to alter the extent of corruption in the country.'4 Along the same lines, it can be argued
the degree ofpoliticalfreedom affects the capacity of bureaucrats  or incumbent enterprises to
exploit  rents  derived  from  administrative  procedures.  In  a despotic  regime,  rents  are  more
likely to  be  captured  by interest  or political  groups  that have more  opportunities  to  exploit
market failures.
12  Our departure  from the public interest  theories of regulation  is mainly justified  by the difficulty to capture this
argument with quantifiable explanatory  variables.  Nevertheless,  for such an approach,  see Djankov et  al (2002).
These authors conclude  in favor of the public choice over the public interest theories  of regulation.
13 For example administrative  capacity  is lower in poor countries.
14 See  Bai and Wei (2001)  for a similar approach with capital  controls.
15The inclusion of the degree of trade orfinancial  openness can be justified on the grounds that
administrative  costs  are  lower  in  an  open  country.  The  process  of liberalizing  forces  the
policymakers  to address a number of vested political  interests, including those of bureaucrats,
which  may  in  turn  lead  to  a  decline  in  administrative  costs  (see  Wei  2000  for  a  fuller
explanation).  We include  the  level  of public  wage  following  the  argument  that  low  paid
bureaucrats are more likely to capture extra rent by raising administrative costs.  To the extent
that the  government's  objective  in  screening  investors  is partially  the  result of the  existing
legalframework, it is relevant to examine its impact on administrative  costs.  Finally, regional
patterns may reflect differences  in cultural factors or mentalities,  which in turn affect the way
through which governments regulate private companies entry and operations.
In  order to test empirically the relationship  between total administrative  costs  and the above
variables,  we  decided to not proceed with cross-country regressions  but rather with simple a
correlation  analysis  for three  main reasons.'5 First,  we cannot  solve  easily the  endogeneity
problems between  administrative costs  and several explanatory  variables  because of the lack
of observations  and, consequently,  degrees of freedom.  16  For example,  as discussed  earlier,
corruption  can be the cause  or be the cause of high administrative  costs.  Second,  it is also
possible  that  both  the  political  variables  and  administrative  costs  are  simultaneously
determined  by  some  deeper  historical  or cultural  factors.  Finally,  there  exist  some  multi-
colinearity  problems  between  variables  (e.g.,  political  freedom  and  corruption  are  highly
correlated)  which can biased the estimated results. Although the correlation analysis  can only
give  us  indications  on  the  basic  relationships  between  variables,  it  aims  at motivating  and
providing directions  for future research.
15  Upon request, the  results of simple OLS regressions  are available.  They do not differ  in their direction  from
the correlation coefficients presented in Table 4.
16 Moreover,  our sample of countries is relatively small and does  not cover  one single reference  year.
16Table 4:Correlation Coefficients  (all variables in logs)
Total Administrative Cost  Total Administrative Cost per
per Procedure over GDP  Procedure over GDP
Local Investor  Foreign Investor
Corruption  -0.62  -0.61
Governance  -0.59  -0.60
Political Freedom  0.40  0.36
Trade/GDP  -0.04  -0.03
FDI/GDP  -0.18  -0.12
Openness Index  -0.59  -0.70
Average Wage  -0.36  -0.54
African countries  0.34  0.52
Anglo-Saxon  Legal Origin  0.17  0.24
Sources::
The  Transparency  International  Index  measures  corruption,  while  governance  was  captured  by  the  scores
compiled by Kauffman,  Kray, and Zoido-Lobaton  (2001).  The degree  of freedom  in each country is defined by
the Freedom  House, which rates the  levels of political rights and civil liberties worldwide  (a low score indicates
more political  freedom).  The  degree of openness has been  defined  using the ratio  of trade over GDP,  the ratio
of FDI  over GDP,  and  the overall  indicator  developed  by the Fraser Institute  (which  includes  an evaluation of
property  rights,  capital and exchange rate controls,  price stability, and structure  of commercial  flows).  Since we
were  unable  to  obtain consistent  data  on  public  wages,  we  used  instead  the average  salary  in  each  country
reported in  the ILO Yearbook and various World Bank's publications.  We classify countries based  on the origin
of their commercial  laws,  distinguishing  by a dummy variable  between  Continental and  Anglo-Saxon systems.
Finally, countries are separated between African and non-African  countries, using a second dummy variable.
The most interesting aspect of the  empirical findings  is that they emphasize  the difficulty  to
reduce administrative costs in corrupt and closed economies.  Reformers will have to face the
resistance  of both  the middle-level  bureaucrats  and incumbent  enterprises.  As expected,  the
negative  correlation  coefficient  between  administrative  costs  and  corruption  (as  well  as
governance)  indicates than high levels of corruption are associated with higher administrative
costs  and  longer delays  for investors.  The  estimated  coefficient  indicates  that the better the
country is  ranked in the  Transparency  database,  the  lower are the administrative  costs  faced
by investors.  In a country with widespread  bureaucratic  corruption,  the government loses  the
ability to collect fiscal revenues  from formal tax channels and, as a consequence,  it has to rely
increasingly  on  the  otherwise  inefficient  and  distortionary  administrative  procedures  to
17finance the provision of public goods17. It is only when the level of corruption is significantly
reduced,  or tax collection  improved, that administrative  costs could be reduced  significantly.
It has to be noted that we found that the costs associated with administrative barriers are lower
in a free political regime, confirming that politicians  and bureaucrats have fewer opportunities
to capture extra rents.'8
The  positive  correlation  coefficient  between  financial  openness  and  administrative  costs
suggests why protected  incumbent firms may resist lower entry barriers.  In relatively closed
economies,  high  administrative  costs  are  likely to  protect  incumbent  enterprises  from  new
entrant  that  might compete  with them.'9 The  causality can  of course  operate  in  two  ways
since  lower administrative  barriers  will  in  turn  encourage  FDI  and,  thus,  create  a virtuous
circle.  It has to be noted that the trade openness  index (as measured by the ratio of trade over
GDP)  was  not  correlated  significantly  with  the  cross-country  variations  in  administrative
costs.
The  other results  can be  briefly  commented.  Average  salaries  do  influence  administrative
costs,  thus  supporting  the  argument that low  paid bureaucrats  are  less  assiduous  in  dealing
with  investors'  requests.  Note,  however,  that we  used the  average  wage  in  each  country
(rather  than  the  average  public  wage),  so  that  our  estimated  coefficient  may  not  capture
properly  this relationship.  The  origin of the  legal system  may  influence  the  administrative
costs  since countries with  a Anglo-Saxon  legal  system appear to have higher  administrative
costs..20  Similarly,  African countries seem to have higher administrative  costs.
VI. Conclusion and What Next
This  paper uses administrative  regulation  data collected  in 32 developing  counties  to show
that governments  impose significant  administrative  costs on firms that want  to establish  and
operate in their country.  While  some procedures  are necessary,  others are not and their costs
vary considerably  across  countries.  The ranking has shown that administrative  costs faced by
17  Or more precisely,  the marginal costs of collecting tax revenues rises with the level of corruption  (see Bai  and
Wei (2001).
18 Djankov et al. found a similar positive correlation with other proxy of political freedom such as political rights
and  efficiency of the judiciary  system.  In  fact,  most political  variables  are  highly  correlated  and it  does  not
matter so much which variable is used  in the regressions.
19 See Hoekman, Kee,  and Olarreaga  (2001  for some empirical evidence.
20  It is possible that administrative  costs and corruption are determined jointly by the origin of the legal system.
18foreign investors  are the lowest in South Africa, Zambia,  and Chile, while they are highest in
Mozambique,  Turkey,  and Romania.  The  variance  between the  best and worst performer  is
extremely  high,  as  the  average  cost  per  procedure  is  more  than  10  times  higher  in
Mozamnbique than in South Africa.
The main conclusions of the paper are the access to land and site development  are the sources
of longest  delays in most countries,  followed by operational  requirements  for import-export,
especially  in  Africa.  Although  business  registration  appears  not  so  costly relative  to  land
access  and  site  development,  there  is  a  wide  dispersion  across  countries.  There  are  no
systematic  positive  correlation  between  the  number  of procedures  and  their  costs  (both
monetary and  in time),  suggesting that the number captures  the govemnments'  willingness  to
protect their  citizen  (the  public  interest  theory  of regulation),  while  costs  may  reflect  the
ability of a few privileged groups to capture those rents (the "public choice"  theory).  Finally,
the  high  and  positive  correlation  between  administrative  costs  on  entry  and  operations
suggests that governments  are equally intrusive before and after the enterprises  is established,
thus weaken the argument that entry regulation is a substitute for operational requirements.
When  policy  advisers  attempt  to  reduce  excessive  red  tape,  they  generally  address
administrative,  technological,  and institutional  issues.  Their emphasis  on the  administrative
aspect  is  justified  because  complex  and  redundant  procedures  are  often  the  result  of
unnecessary  forms, signatures,  and documents.  Technology  can also provide a useful tool by
linking together  agencies  via virtual  networks  and,  thus,  facilitating  the  relations  not  only
between  investors  and  government's  officials  but  also  within  the  public  administration.
Finally,  there has been a strong push towards  institutional  reforms -most notably in  favor of
the so-called one-stop-shop.
The  traditional  recommendations  are important, but far from sufficient.  Given our results,  it
is not surprising that recent efforts aimed at streamlining administrative barriers  have failed to
bring the expected results.  This limited success has been explained by the lack of coordinated
effort  across  the  public  sector  and  the  resistance  from  middle-level  bureaucrats,  who  may
prefer to maintain the status quo.  Last but not least, it often involves changing mentalities and
behaviors,  which takes  time  and prolonged  actions  as well  as  strong political  commitment.
Our  analysis  has  shown  that  rationalizing  administrative  procedures  is  a  difficult  task.
Administrative  costs  reflect more  profound  characteristics  of each country.  Countries  with
19higher corruption levels, lower quality of govemance, lower degree of financial  openness,  and
lower  public  wages  are  more  likely  to  have  higher  administrative  costs.  It  seems  that
administrative  reforms must be  incorporated  in broader reforms,  such  as trade  and financial
liberalization,  corruption and public  sector reforms.
There are at least four directions  for future research.  The first direction consists of improving
data  and  inputs.  Not only  the  quality  of the  data  needs  to  be  improved  for the  countries
included  in  this  study,  but  it  would  also  be  especially  useful  to  expand  the  number  of
countries by including Latin American and East Asian countries.  The second direction would
be to use the database for identifying best practices and helping govermments in their efforts to
set up targets and monitor progress over time.  This effort would need to account for the legal
and  institutional  framework  in  each  country,  beyond  the quantitative  approach  followed  in
this paper.  The third direction  would be to  go one  step  further in  the understanding  of the
causes behind the variations  in administrative costs  by giving,  for example,  further attention
to  the  eventual  role  of institutions  such as  "one-stop  shops"  or  "enterprises  networks"  that
have  been  implemented  in  various  countries,  sometimes  with  success.  Finally,  the  fourth
direction would be to examine the impact of administrative  costs on investment decisions  and
on firms'  productivity.  A first indication  of this impact  can be  derived  from the  estimated
elasticity reported  in our correlation  analysis:  for every  10  percentage point decrease  in the
administrative costs (as perceived by foreign investors and in percentage  of GDP), the ratio of
FDI  over  GDP  rises  by  about  1.2  percentage  points.  This  empirical  result  should  be
interpreted with caution but is indicative  of the significant positive impact that a reduction in
administrative cost may produce on foreign direct investment.  It should provide a motivation
for future research.
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